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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Intelligence

SUBJECT: The Various Estimates of North Vietnamese Logistic Capabilities and Logistic Requirements to Support Military Activities in South Vietnam

1. CIA and DIA have over the past several months been unable to reach agreement on the logistic requirements for the Communist main forces in South Vietnam. At the current CB the CIA estimate has been about 6 tons per day and the DIA estimate has been about 20 tons per day. The differences in the two estimates have been consistent over time and arise from three basic causes:

a. DIA inclusion of a Class I (Food) requirement for porters and infiltrators, and for PAVN forces; this requirement is not carried in CIA estimates.

b. DIA inclusion of a Class III (POL) requirement for PAVN forces which is not included in CIA estimates.

c. A general attribution by DIA of a logistic requirement for PAVN forces which is roughly 9 times the requirement for Viet Cong forces on a pound per man per day basis. CIA has tended to give PAVN and Viet Cong forces approximately the same requirements.

2. Both the CIA and DIA estimates have been dwarfed by the current MACV estimate of 84 tons per day

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3. DIA has apparently been able to give a general acceptance to the MACV estimates. Since we have not seen the input data for the MACV estimate we are neither able to refute or accept it.

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[redacted] We are attempting to  
obtain from DIA a detailed recapitulation of the MACV methodology and  
estimate.

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[redacted]  
Deputy Chief, Trade  
and Services Division, ORR

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